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The three women that form the focus of this special issue, Susan
Stebbing (1895–1943), Susanne Langer (1895–1985), and Maria
Kokoszyńska (1905–1981), belong to the ﬁrst group of women
who became recognized philosophers by obtaining a perma-
nent university position in philosophy. Although there were
women philosophers before the twentieth century, it was gen-
erally impossible for them to develop a career at a university.
For this we have to wait until the time after World War I. Steb-
bing, Langer and Kokoszyńska can be seen as standing in the
analytic tradition, in a narrow and wider sense. In the case of
Stebbing and Kokoszyńska this claim is not controversial. Steb-
bing was, for example, instrumental in the founding of Anal-
ysis. While her interest in metaphysical analysis is distinctive
she was part of a broader analytical conversation (e.g., Stebbing
1932). Kokoszyńska was a leading member of the Lvov-Warsaw
School, which, early on already, Ernest Nagel identiﬁed as one
the founding pillars of analytical philosophy (Nagel 1936). In
the case of Langer, who is now primarily associated with Cas-
sirer’s philosophy and her work in aesthetics, this identiﬁcation
is less obvious and we return to this below.
In the broader sense, analytic philosophy may be understood
as aiming at precise concepts, providing a justiﬁcation for pro-
nounced theses, proclaiming an empirical or analytical method,
and understanding itself as related to mathematics or the em-
pirical sciences. In the twentieth century two important factors
were added to analytic philosophy: the linguistic turn, and the
application of a highly formalized method to problems of phi-
losophy. Stebbing, Langer and Kokoszyńska are also part of the
movement in the more strict sense of analytic philosophy, and
they were educated at the centres of analytic philosophy of their
time. If we focus on the period before World War II, centres of
analytic philosophy in the strict sense are to be found in Lvov,
Warsaw, Vienna, Cambridge, and Harvard. Of these, perhaps,
the inclusion ofHarvard is controversial, but the paper byGiulia
Felappi helps us to understand why it is legitimate to include
Harvard.
We speak of the Lvov-Warsaw School, the Vienna Circle, and
theCambridge School ofAnalysis, and of British analytic philos-
ophy in general. Perhaps, we can also speak of aHarvard School
of philosophy. Whitehead was appointed as a professor in Har-
vard in 1924,1 where Sheﬀer was already working as a logician.
Together with the conceptual pragmatist C. I. Lewis, they pro-
vided a welcoming environment for analytical philosophy (see,
e.g., Hunter 2016). Analytic philosophers at Harvardweremore
positive towards pragmatism and certain forms of Kantianism.
From 1940 on, with Carnap and Tarski entering the stage and
joining Quine, Harvard became the most inﬂuential centre for
analytic philosophy at the time. Felappi’s essay on Langer gives
a sense of the kind of philosophy of language that Quine would
have encountered during his education at Harvard.
Before World War I, some women were active in analytic phi-
losophy in Britain, for example LadyWelby and E. E. Constance
Jones.2 The logician Constance Jones, Mistress at Girton Col-
lege, probably inﬂuenced Stebbing to develop in the direction
of logic. Girton College, a women’s college founded in 1869,
was near to Cambridge, but Cambridge did not allow women
to graduate. For this reason Stebbing moved from Girton to
1Later in life Quine and Davidson provided highly negative accounts of
Whitehead’s impact at Harvard. But it is worth noting that Quine’s treatment
of Whitehead in the Schilpp volume (Quine 1941) is not so critical, and that
his ‘Truth by Convention’ (Quine 1936) appeared in a Festschrift devoted to
Whitehead.
2Chapters on Welby and Constance Jones can be found in Waithe (1995).
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King’s College London, and later to Badford College, a women’s
college as well. Stebbing became the ﬁrst female professor of
philosophy in Britain in 1933 at the University of London (Wis-
dom 1944). She was a major public intellectual and had great
organisational talents, including oﬀering shelter to the stateless
Rose Rand in 1939, when she had ﬂed from the Nazis.3 We
return to Rose Rand below.
In the United States the situation was comparable to that in
Britain. Next door to Harvard, a women’s college, Radcliﬀe Col-
lege or the ‘Harvard Annex’, was founded in 1879. At Ratcliﬀe,
the students were taught by the professors from Harvard. Su-
sanne Langer, who was educated at Radcliﬀe, was thus taught
by Sheﬀer and, later, by Whitehead. Women’s colleges must
have played an important part in the education of women, and
thus made it easier for them to graduate at a university and
develop a career as a philosopher than in Germany and Austria
where such colleges were absent.
The University of Vienna, for example, only allowed women
to attend university lectures as guest auditors in 1878, and to
become students in 1895. The situation improved with the Vi-
enna Circle in the 1920s. Women could become members of the
Circle; for example, Rose Rand, who took the oﬃcial notes of the
meetings. We do not know of any female member of the Vienna
Circle who made a professional, philosophical career, but that
may also be explained by the hostile attitude of theNazis. Fair to
say, one cannot blame the Vienna Circle for not oﬀering Rand a
job in the thirties, as the situation for Jews becamemost diﬃcult
in Vienna as a whole, and not a few members of the Circle had
to ﬂee themselves.
The situation in Germany for female philosophers was even
more diﬃcult than in Vienna. We see that women could be-
come a professor’s assistant at times of absence of young men,
3Biographicalmaterial onRand’s diﬃcult life as a philosopher can be found
in Hamacher-Hermes (2003).
due to the losses inWorldWar I. In Freiburg, Husserl appointed
Edith Stein as research and teaching assistant, but he did not
support her aim to have an independent career.4 The hierar-
chical structure at German universities enforced the ideal of a
professor developing a system of philosophy and a group of
adherents whose value seemed to be determined by their un-
derstanding of themaster’s voice. Independent womenmay not
be attracted to such a practice. Hannah Arendt was confronted
with a similar situation when studying under Heidegger. The
physical closeness between the two made the possibility to de-
velop an independent career even worse, in addition to the fact
that Arendt was Jewish. She had to ﬂee from both Germany and
Heidegger in order to develop as a philosopher with a recog-
nized position.
The situation in France with its excellent education at a pre-
university level was better than in Germany. The brilliant Si-
mone Weil was a pupil of Alain (Émile Chartier) at Lycée Henri
IV, just like Simone de Beauvoir. Weil could develop a philo-
sophical mind already in the classroom, receiving her agrégation
in philosophy in 1931, thereby gaining the right to teach at a
secondary school.
The most fascinating story to be told, though, concerns the
presence of women in the Lvov-Warsaw School in the 1920s and
1930s. Kazimierz Twardowski, a pupil of Franz Brentano in Vi-
enna, was asked to set up a philosophy department as part of the
PolishUniversity in Lemberg (Lvov). Twardowski held his inau-
gural lecture in 1895, in a town that is now part of the Ukraine,
4See Spiegelberg (1978, 223–24). The book contains also information
on other female members of the phenomenological movement, such as
Hedwig Conrad-Martius. The tragic fate of the Jewish Edith Stein is de-
scribed in M. Sawicki, ‘Personal Connections: The Phenomenology of Edith
Stein’, http://library.nd.edu/colldev/subject_home_pages/catholic/
personal_connections.shtml. Information regarding a research project at
Paderborn University on women in the phenomonological movement can be
found at https://historyofwomenphilosophers.org/summer-school/.
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but was part of the Habsburg Empire at the time. Twardowski’s
students were a miscellaneous group of hard-working students;
a third of the students in Lemberg were Jews. Twardowski was
a great organiser, and a severe but inspiring teacher. He was
able to attract the best students, and taught them a high stan-
dard of intellectual rigor. Twardowski himself was not a formal
logician, although he lectured on Boole, Schröder, Russell and
Frege. His students Łukasiewicz and Leśniewski absorbed the
ideas of Frege and Russell, and were soon to develop a logic of
their own. Alfred Tarski, a second generation member of the
School, presented his lecture on the semantic deﬁnition of truth
in Warsaw, Lemberg and Vienna in 1930. Students of Twar-
dowski also got positions in Warsaw, and we now speak of the
Lvov-Warsaw School.
In order to ensure that women could enter the university,
Twardowski took care that a secondary school for women was
founded in Lemberg.5 He managed to attract quite an amount
of female students. If we look at pictures of the 1920s with
Twardowski surrounded by his students and assistants, we
see that more than a third is female.6 Twardowski’s students
also had many female students, and at least ten women of
the School were able to develop a career as philosopher at a
university (Pakszys 1998). The most important ones are Jan-
ina Hosiasson, Izydora Da˛mbska, Maria Ossowska, Janina Ko-
tarbinska, and Maria Kokoszyńska. The members of the group
mainly published in Polish, but there are also papers in German,
partly due to contact with the Vienna Circle. Rose Rand, who
was born in Lemberg, but went to the gymnasium in Vienna,
5This secondary school (gymnasium)was established in 1920. Earlier, since
1896, Twardowski taught at the Society of Academic Courses for Women; in
1897, he became the secretary of this society. Cf. Twardowski (2014, 18, 20).
We thank Anna Brożek for providing this information.
6A lot of information on women of the Lvov-Warsaw School can be found
inWoleński (1989). Cf. also Pakszys (1998). Page 32 ofWoleński’s book shows
a picture of Twardowski surrounded by 5 male and 8 female students.
could read Polish, and translated writings of the Lvov-Warsaw
School at a later date. The Vienna Circle came into contact
with the Lvov-Warsaw School through Alfred Tarski and Maria
Kokoszyńska. Kokoszyńska met most members of the Circle at
the pre-conference in Prague in 1934, and she visited Vienna in
1934 for ﬁve months, where she was immediately invited to the
meetings of the Circle. Besides her own contributions, she was
there an advocate of Tarski’s semantic account of truth and of
the ideas in the Lvov-Warsaw School in general.
To what extent is the fact that Stebbing, Langer, and
Kokoszyńska were women relevant not only to their philosoph-
ical career, but also to their writings? Both Langer and Stebbing
wrote an extensive introduction to logic, while Kokoszyńska
worked on a logical semantics. Did they choose logic, simply
because it attracted so many creative intellects at the time, or is
logic more openminded towards outsiders? Could it be that the
criteria for quality are more sex-neutral in logic than in other
parts of philosophy? At the same time, their interest in logic
turned out not to be purely formal. Kokoszyńska was interested
in a scientiﬁc metaphysics, and the semantic notion of truth.
Stebbing became an important public intellectual, starting with
her book Thinking to Some Purpose (1939). And Susanne Langer
developed into a very famous philosopher of music and art in
general.7
The women that form a focus of this volume also have a non-
sectarian interest: looking at other schools in order to under-
stand how they could develop their own mind, as well as to
inform the schools of each other. Kant andNeo-Kantianismwas
a lifelong inﬂuence on Langer. Kokoszyńska and Stebbing me-
diated between the Vienna Circle and their own analytic school,
while at the same time pointing out the diﬀerences. Stebbing
7See, for example, the extraordinary proﬁle by Winthrop Sargeant (1960).
We thank Branden Fitelson for calling our attention to it and making it avail-
able to us.
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invited Carnap, and organised the 4th conference on the Unity
of Science at Girton College in 1938. The topic was the lan-
guage of science, and Janina Hosiasson andMaria Kokoszyńska
presented a paper there (Stadler 1997). As Frederique Janssen-
Lauret shows, Stebbing was not a mainstream analytic philoso-
pher, as she stood positive towards British idealism. In this
sense our volume may also be understood as an endorsement
of a broader view on analytic philosophy, both from a historical
and a philosophical point of view.
The paper on Stebbing understands her as a transitional ﬁg-
ure. Janssen-Lauret points to an inﬂuence of Bradley’s Appear-
ance and Reality on Stebbing. A form of holism is thus present in
Stebbing’s writings, visible in her holistic view on philosophical
analysis. This idea must have been an important inﬂuence on
Susan Haack’s so-called foundherentism, and is in accordance
with the developments of analytic philosophy in the U.S., es-
pecially at Harvard. Stebbing’s thesis that symbols can only be
called complete or incomplete relative to a given usage, makes
room for a view on analysis that does not assume a Russel-
lian epistemology or metaphysics. Stebbing also uses her sharp
mind to criticise Russell’s use-mention confusions.
Giulia Felappi focuses on Langer’s earlier, lesser known writ-
ings. Langer explicitly stresses the relevance of logic for other
parts of philosophy, especially epistemology and metaphysics.
Under the inﬂuence ofWhitehead she understandsmetaphysics
to be a rational science. On Langer’s linguistic variant of
Kantianism—and this inclines us to include the ‘Harvard school’
within analytical philosophy—though, metaphysical questions
are not independent of questions of meaning and mind: a fact
is composed of objects already interpreted.
Anna Brożek introduces Maria Kokoszyńska to a wider pub-
lic, and focuses on those aspects of her writings that refer to
problems discussed in Vienna, thereby showing the diﬀerences
between the Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School. Like
her supervisor Twardowski, and the Lvov-Warsaw School in
general, Kokoszyńska defended the thesis that a scientiﬁc meta-
physics is possible, and that one should not limit the logic of
science to syntax. Furthermore, she criticized earlier, more rad-
ical interpretations of the idea of the unity of science. Last, but
not least, her defence of Tarski’s semantic notion of truth, and
her own semantic explanation of truth may have contributed to
a further positive reception of Tarski by members of the Vienna
Circle. Carnap in particular became convinced that a logical
semantics, and an exact deﬁnition of a certain role of truth, is
possible.
The three women that form the focus of this volume agree
in at least two important aspects. Their ideas on what analytic
philosophy is, seems to be less narrowly deﬁned than in the
case of many of their male peers: each of these women had an
interest in metaphysics already at an early date. And, they were
interested in the ideas of the other schools of analytic philoso-
phy. Where many male philosophers may sometimes see other
schools as rivals, these women were convinced that philosophy
may improve by understanding what is going on elsewhere.
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